



USAID | **УКРАЇНА**
ВІД АМЕРИКАНСЬКОГО НАРОДУ

ALL-UKRAINIAN SURVEY OF JUDGES REGARDING THE INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE JUDICIARY, JUDICIAL REFORM, PERCEPTION OF AND REPORTING ON CORRUPTION

REPORT

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KEY RESULTS

Perception of judicial independence and its individual aspects

One-fifth (20%) of judges surveyed rated the independence of judges in Ukraine at 5 out of ten, and the same proportion (20%) at 8 out of ten. Only 1% of respondents believe that the independence of the judges is completely absent, and the opposite view is held by 9% of judges.

One third of judges surveyed (34%) rates their independence at the highest score, and another fifth (21%) at 9 out of 10. Only 7% of judges surveyed rate their own judicial independence at up to 5 points.

34% of respondents indicated that their judicial independence had only strengthened since their appointment. Almost a quarter (24%) indicated a weakening of independence.

Only 4% of the judges surveyed strongly believe that in the last two years some judges have had an illegal benefit for making certain decisions in cases, another 16% are more likely to be convinced of this. At the same time, almost one in five judges (18%) strongly disagrees with this statement, and a third - 34% - rather disagrees. Also, 15% of judges who took part in the survey refused to answer this question.

4% of those who agrees that such cases of bribery have been in Ukrainian courts over the past two years, mentioned that it happens on a regular basis, and a third (33%) that sometimes.

The vast majority of judges surveyed (92%) agreed that courts in Ukraine adhere to the standards of judicial ethics. Nearly three-quarters of judges surveyed agreed that the High Council of Justice effectively enforces disciplinary proceedings against judges, a judge who has information about his colleagues' corruption must report it to NABU immediately, and that the judiciary in Ukraine effectively addresses corruption in the judiciary. (74%, 74% and 73% respectively).

35% of judges surveyed agreed that in Ukraine over the past two years, individual judges have heard cases and made decisions under the pressure of actual or expected action by the media.

Only one in ten judges (13%) agreed with the statement that in the last two years in our country the selection and appointment of judges is not based on the abilities, experience and competence of candidates, but on other factors.

89% of judges mentioned that the court management had not affected their independence in the last two years. 88% indicated that such actions were not taken by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, and 87% each by the Council of Judges of Ukraine and the High Council of Justice.

The judiciary and judicial reform

Three-quarters of judges agreed that the High Council of Justice effectively protects the independence of judges in Ukraine (73%), almost two in three judges (65%) said that the Council of Judges of Ukraine effectively protects the independence of judges in Ukraine, and only one in five (20%), called the involvement of PCI in the competitive selection of judges and qualification evaluation of judges justified.

Half (54%) of the judges surveyed consider it necessary to reform the current model of involving the people in the process of administration of justice through the institution of juries, and a third (31%) could not decide on their answer.

More than half of the judges surveyed (58%) consider a mixed jury model more appropriate for Ukraine.

Personal trust to government and non-government institutions

Judges are least trust the media and journalists (trusted by only 12% of respondents), NGOs (14%) and political parties (15%). The highest trust is the judiciary - 86% of respondents said so, 79% - trust the High Council of Justice, and 75% - the Supreme Court.

In total, only 9% of judges noted that they had been personally pressured to make certain decisions over the past two years.

One in five judges surveyed (21%) said he/she had received threats of disciplinary or other liability in the past two years, or had been disciplined or prosecuted for making a decision in a case.

A quarter of judges surveyed (25%) definitely or rather agreed that there had been negative changes in their working conditions over the past two years, and 56% said the opposite.

32% of judges surveyed said that if they receive information about a possible bribe from a colleague, they will inform NABU, 28% - that they will try to convince a colleague of the falsity of this decision, and every fifth (21%) will inform the chairman of the court.

In general, 47% of the surveyed judges consider themselves aware of the norms of the international humanitarian community, and 11% are generally unaware.

METHODOLOGY

All-Ukrainian survey of judges was conducted by Info Sapiens between February 24 and April 5, 2021. The survey included all regions of Ukraine except the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the survey was conducted only in the territories controlled by Ukraine.

A total of 559 judges were interviewed in 129 courts. Of the planned 153 courts (including Supreme Court) and additional 24 courts selected in regions with low response rates, 48 rejections were received, due to high workload of judges, reduction of court staff, refusal of judges to participate in survey.

The survey was conducted in the form of an interview via a web interface (CAWI). Each judge, through a responsible person in his court, received a link to the questionnaire, which is posted on the server of Info Sapiens. The anonymity of the survey was ensured.

The survey sample is representative taking into account the distribution by type of jurisdiction, instance and region. The sample includes courts of higher instance (Supreme Court), appellate courts (courts of appeal of general jurisdiction, appellate administrative court, appellate commercial court), local courts of general jurisdiction (district, city, city, district in cities), local administrative courts and local commercial courts. Among the courts of appeal of general jurisdiction, local courts of general jurisdiction, local administrative courts and local commercial courts within each region, the courts were selected at random on a proportional to population size basis (PPS). Judges in each court were also randomly selected for questioning.

PERCEPTION OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ITS INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS

One-fifth (20%) of judges surveyed rated the independence of judges in Ukraine at 5 out of ten, and the same proportion (20%) at 8 out of ten. Only 1% of respondents believe that the independence of the judges is completely absent, and the opposite view is held by 9% of judges.

TABLE 1.1. HOW DO YOU ASSESS THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES IN UKRAINE ON A SCALE FROM 0 TO 10, WHERE 0 MEANS "NO INDEPENDENCE AT ALL" AND 10 MEANS "THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE"? (% AMONG ALL JUDGES, N=559)

	TOTAL
0 no independence at all	1%
1	2%
2	3%
3	6%
4	4%
5	20%
6	5%
7	18%
8	20%
9	13%
10 the highest level of judicial independence	9%
N	559

One third of judges surveyed (34%) rated their independence at the highest score, and another fifth (21%) at 9 out of 10. Only 7% of judges surveyed rate their own judicial independence at up to 5 points.

TABLE 1.2. HOW DO YOU ASSESS YOUR INDEPENDENCE AS A JUDGE ON A SCALE FROM 0 TO 10, WHERE 0 MEANS "NO INDEPENDENCE AT ALL" AND 10 MEANS "THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE", N=559

	TOTAL
0 no independence at all	0%
1	1%
2	1%
3	3%
4	2%

	TOTAL
5	9%
6	3%
7	10%
8	15%
9	21%
10 the highest level of judicial independence	34%
N	559

34% of respondents indicated that their judicial independence had only strengthened since their appointment, another 38% indicated that it remained at the same level, and almost a quarter (24%) indicated a weakening of independence.

TABLE 1.3. SINCE YOUR APPOINTMENT AS A JUDGE, YOUR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:

	TOTAL
Significantly strengthened	17%
Slightly strengthened	16%
Remains at the same level	38%
Slightly weakened	14%
Significantly weakened	10%
Refuse to answer	5%
N	559

Only 4% of the judges surveyed strongly believe that in the last two years some judges have had an illegal benefit for making certain decisions in cases, another 16% are more likely to be convinced of this. At the same time, almost one in five judges (18%) strongly disagrees with this statement, and a third - 34% - rather disagrees. Also, 15% of judges who took part in the survey refused to answer this question.

TABLE 1.4. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE (OR DISAGREE) WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: I BELIEVE THAT IN MY COUNTRY DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS SOME JUDGES ILLEGALLY BENEFITED FROM ADOPTING CERTAIN DECISIONS IN A CASE(S): (% AMONG ALL JUDGES, N=559)

	TOTAL
Strongly agree	4%
Sooner agree than not	16%
Neither agree nor disagree	13%
Rather disagree	34%
Strongly disagree	18%
Refuse to answer	15%
N	559

4% of those who agrees that such cases of bribery have been in Ukrainian courts over the past two years, mentioned that it happens on a regular basis, and a third (33%) that sometimes.

TABLE 1.5. IF YOU AGREE OR STRONGLY AGREE WITH THIS STATEMENT, HOW OFTEN IN YOUR OPINION DID IT OCCUR? (% AMONG THOSE WHO AGREE OR RATHER AGREE THAT FOR THE LAST TWO YEARS, SOME JUDGES HAVE HAD AN ILLEGAL BENEFIT, N=114)

	TOTALS
Constantly	4%
Sometimes	33%
Very rarely	32%
Hard to answer	30%
Refuse to answer	2%
N	114

The vast majority of judges surveyed (92%) agreed that courts in Ukraine adhere to the standards of judicial ethics. Nearly three-quarters of judges surveyed agreed that the High Council of Justice effectively enforces disciplinary proceedings against judges, a judge who has information about his colleagues' corruption must report it to NABU immediately, and that the judiciary in Ukraine effectively addresses corruption in the judiciary. (74%, 74% and 73% respectively).

TABLE 1.6. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE (OR DISAGREE) WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS: (% AMONG ALL JUDGES, N=559)

	STRONGLY / SOONER AGREE THAN NOT	NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE	STRONGLY / RATHER DISAGREE	REFUSE TO ANSWER
Judges in Ukraine adhere to the standards of judicial ethics	92%	6%	2%	0%
The High Council of Justice effectively ensures the conduct of disciplinary proceedings against judges	74%	15%	9%	2%
A judge who has information about the corrupt actions of his/her colleagues must immediately report this to the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU).	74%	11%	7%	8%
The judiciary in Ukraine effectively addresses corruption in the judiciary	73%	17%	7%	3%
A judge who has information about the corrupt actions of his/her colleagues must immediately notify other (except NABU) law enforcement agencies.	59%	12%	18%	10%

At the same time, 35% of judges surveyed agreed that in Ukraine over the past two years, individual judges have heard cases and made decisions under the pressure of actual or expected action by the media.

Only one in ten judges (13%) agreed with the statement that in the last two years in our country the selection and appointment of judges is not based on the abilities, experience and competence of candidates, but on other factors.

TABLE 1.7. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE (OR DISAGREE) WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS: (% AMONG ALL JUDGES, N=559)

	STRONGLY / SOONER AGREE THAN NOT	NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE	STRONGLY / RATHER DISAGREE	REFUSE TO ANSWER
Over the last two years In Ukraine, have individual judges considered cases and made decisions under the pressure of actual or expected actions by the media (press, television, radio)?	35%	15%	45%	5%
In Ukraine over the last two years, have individual judges heard cases and made decisions under the pressure of actual or expected actions on the part of social network users (Facebook, Twitter, etc.)?	21%	9%	64%	6%
In the last two years in our country, is the selection and appointment of judges based not on the abilities, experience and competence of candidates, but on other factors?	13%	10%	70%	6%

The vast majority of judges (89%) mentioned that the court management had not affected their independence in the last two years. 88% indicated that such actions were not taken by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, and 87% each by the Council of Judges of Ukraine and the High Council of Justice. 25% of the respondents indicated their influence on their independence by the Parliament and the Government, and another 20% by the President of Ukraine and the media.

TABLE 1.8. «TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE (OR DISAGREE) THAT, DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS, THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF YOUR INDEPENDENCE AS A JUDGE BY THE FOLLOWING ACTORS: (% AMONG ALL JUDGES, N=559)

	STRONGLY / SOONER AGREE THAN NOT	NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE	STRONGLY / RATHER DISAGREE	REFUSE TO ANSWER
Court management (including the President of the Court where you work, and/or leadership of the higher court)	89%	2%	5%	4%
Constitutional Court	88%	3%	5%	4%
Council of Judges of Ukraine	87%	4%	6%	3%
High Council of Justice	87%	3%	7%	3%
Supreme Court of Ukraine	86%	3%	6%	4%
High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine	84%	3%	8%	5%
Big business representatives	83%	4%	8%	5%
National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU)	82%	5%	8%	5%
Police	81%	7%	8%	5%
Prosecutor's Office	80%	7%	8%	5%
Litigation lawyers	79%	7%	11%	4%
Other (except for lawyers) participants of court proceedings	78%	7%	11%	4%
State Judicial Administration of Ukraine	77%	5%	14%	4%
Political parties and individual politicians	72%	6%	18%	4%
Protestors and demonstrators near the courthouse	70%	6%	20%	4%
Social media (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn)	70%	8%	19%	4%
The media (press, television, radio)	69%	8%	20%	3%
President of Ukraine	68%	7%	20%	5%
Civil society organizations	67%	8%	21%	4%
Government	64%	7%	25%	4%
Parliament	64%	7%	25%	4%

THE JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL REFORM

Three-quarters of judges agreed that the High Council of Justice effectively protects the independence of judges in Ukraine (73%), almost two in three judges (65%) said that the Council of Judges of Ukraine effectively protects the independence of judges in Ukraine, and only one in five (20%), called the involvement of PCI in the competitive selection of judges and qualification evaluation of judges justified.

TABLE 2.1. TO WHAT EXTENT YOU AGREE (OR DISAGREE) WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS: (% AMONG ALL JUDGES, N=559)

	STRONGLY / SOONER AGREE THAN NOT	NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE	STRONGLY / RATHER DISAGREE	REFUSE TO ANSWER
The High Council of Justice effectively protects the independence of judges in Ukraine	73%	14%	12%	1%
The Council of Judges of Ukraine effectively protects the independence of judges in Ukraine	65%	19%	15%	1%
Lawyers and prosecutors taking part in the process use the institution of a disciplinary complaint to put pressure on a judge in order to persuade them to make a certain decision in a case.	52%	22%	24%	2%
The activity of the High Anti-Corruption Court have a positive impact on tackling corruption in Ukraine	48%	25%	22%	5%
The involvement of international experts in the competitive selection of judges of the High Anti-Corruption Court was a justified and a was positive step	39%	17%	41%	3%
Involvement of representatives of the public * in the competitive selection of judges and qualification evaluation of judges is justified	20%	18%	60%	2%
* Public Council of Integrity				

Half (54%) of the judges surveyed consider it necessary to reform the current model of involving the people in the process of administration of justice through the institution of juries, and a third (31%) could not decide on their answer.

TABLE 2.2. DO YOU THINK THAT THE CURRENT MODEL OF INVOLVING THE PEOPLE IN THE PROCESS OF ADMINISTERING JUSTICE AS JURORS IN UKRAINE NEEDS TO BE REFORMED?: (% AMONG ALL JUDGES, N=559)

	TOTAL
Yes	54%
No	13%
Hard to say	31%
Refusal	3%
N	559

More than half of the judges surveyed (58%) consider a mixed jury model more appropriate for Ukraine.

TABLE 2.3. WHAT MODEL OF JURY TRIAL DO YOU CONSIDER THE MOST APPROPRIATE FOR UKRAINE? (% AMONG ALL JUDGES, N=559)

	TOTAL
A model where jurors are separated from a professional judge and decide on the fact of a crime and pass a verdict, whereas a judge decides on issues of law (sentencing), i.e. passes a verdict on the basis of a jury verdict (classical model)	38%
A model where jurors and professional judges jointly decide matters of fact and law (mixed model)	58%
Other	4%
N	559

PERSONAL TRUST TO GOVERNMENT AND NON-GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

The interviewed judges trust the judiciary the most - 86% of respondents said so, 79% - trust the High Council of Justice, and 75% - the Supreme Court. Judges trust the NAPC the most in the non-judicial system - 52% of judges surveyed trust this law enforcement agency more or less. 45% of respondents trust the President of Ukraine and local governments. Judges are least trusted by the media and journalists (trusted by only 12% of respondents), NGOs (14%) and political parties (15%).

TABLE 3.1. TO WHAT EXTENT YOU PERSONALLY TRUST THESE GOVERNMENT AND NON-GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS: (% AMONG ALL JUDGES, N=559)

	FULLY / SOONER TRUST THAN NOT	NEITHER TRUST NOR DISTRUST	DO NOT TRUST AT ALL / RATHER DISTRUST	REFUSE TO ANSWER
The judiciary (in general)	86%	6%	1%	6%
The High Council of Justice	79%	11%	5%	6%
The Supreme Court	75%	14%	5%	6%
High Anti-Corruption Court	67%	17%	8%	8%
National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC)	52%	25%	16%	8%
SBU (Security Service of Ukraine)	51%	28%	12%	8%
Prosecution bodies	50%	31%	11%	8%
National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU)	49%	28%	15%	8%
DBR (State Bureau of Investigation)	49%	31%	12%	9%
President of Ukraine	45%	24%	23%	9%
Local governments	45%	34%	12%	8%
Police	45%	33%	14%	7%
State Enforcement Service	43%	36%	13%	8%
Ministries and departments	38%	31%	22%	9%
The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine	36%	26%	29%	9%
The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	35%	26%	30%	9%
Private enforcement officers	35%	39%	16%	10%
Political parties	15%	27%	46%	12%
Non-government organizations	14%	32%	44%	10%
Mass media / journalists	12%	33%	46%	9%

In total, only 9% of judges noted that they had been personally pressured to make certain decisions over the past two years.

TABLE 3.2. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE (OR DISAGREE) WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS I WAS SUBJECTED TO PRESSURE IN ORDER TO MAKE ME ADOPT A CERTAIN DECISION ON THE CASE (THE WHOLE OR PART OF IT)? (% AMONG ALL JUDGES, N=559)

	TOTAL
Definitely agree	3%
Rather agree than not	6%
Equally agree and disagree	6%
Rather disagree	20%
Strongly disagree	64%
It is difficult to answer	3%
N	559

Only 46 of judges indicated that they were pressured to make appropriate decisions, but that number was not enough to reliably analyze the data. As part of the assessment of response trends, it is possible to note the irregularity and rarity of such pressure.

TABLE 3.3. IF IN QUESTION 1 THE ANSWER IS 1 OR 2 (I.E. IF YOU RATHER AGREE OR UNCONDITIONALLY AGREE WITH THE PREVIOUS STATEMENT), HOW OFTEN DID SUCH INSTANCES OCCUR?: (% AMONG THOSE WHO DEFINITELY OR RATHER AGREED THAT THEY WERE PRESSURED, N=46)

	TOTAL
Constantly	7%
Sometimes	39%
Very rarely	48%
It's hard to say	7%
N	46*

As only 46 judges indicated that they had been pressured to make relevant decisions, the results were only biased and indicated pressure from both the garlic officers and the civil society and the media.

TABLE 3.4. INDICATE WHICH SUBJECTS EXERTED THIS PRESSURE: (% AMONG THOSE WHO DEFINITELY OR RATHER AGREED THAT THEY WERE PRESSURED, N=46)

	TOTAL
Participants in court proceedings	61%
Representatives of public associations	50%
Media representatives	43%
Lawyers	41%
Prosecutors	30%

	TOTAL
Representatives of the executive branch	17%
Representatives of political parties	17%
Representatives of the legislature	9%
Local governments	4%
Representatives of the judiciary (Supreme Court, High Council of Justice, Council of Judges of Ukraine, State Judicial Administration, etc.)	2%
N	46*

One in five judges surveyed (21%) said they had received threats of disciplinary or other liability in the past two years, or had been disciplined or prosecuted for making a decision in a case. Only 2% of judges surveyed said that in the last two years, the management of their court had instructed them to make certain decisions in cases.

TABLE 3.5. TO WHAT EXTENT YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS: (% AMONG ALL JUDGES, N=559)

	STRONGLY / SOONER AGREE THAN NOT	NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE	STRONGLY / RATHER DISAGREE	REFUSE TO ANSWER
For the past two years, I have received threats of disciplinary or other liability, or I have been subject to disciplinary or other liability as a result of passing a certain decision in a case.	21%	9%	67%	3%
During the last two years, there have been incidents where my decision were influenced by complaints about my actions filed by participants in court proceedings, or by threats to bring me to disciplinary, criminal or administrative liability.	3%	6%	89%	2%
For the past two years, the management of my court has been instructing me on the timing of adopting decisions in cases	3%	2%	94%	1%
During the last two years in my court there have been instances of assigning cases in violation of the procedure and (or) rules established by law in order to influence the results of their consideration.	2%	2%	92%	4%
Over the last two years, the leadership of my court has instructed me to make certain decisions in cases	2%	1%	96%	1%

A quarter of judges surveyed (25%) definitely or rather agreed that there had been negative changes in their working conditions over the past two years, and 56% said the opposite.

TABLE 3.6. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE (OR DISAGREE) THAT OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS THERE HAVE BEEN SOME CHANGES IN YOUR WORKING ENVIRONMENT THAT HAVE ADVERSELY AFFECTED YOUR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE? (% AMONG ALL JUDGES, N=559)

	TOTAL
Definitely agree	9%
Rather agree than not	16%
Equally agree and disagree	15%
Rather disagree	26%
Strongly disagree	30%
Refuse to answer	4%
N	559

82% of those judges who agreed that changes had taken place in the last two years that had negatively affected judicial independence, indicated that such changes were related to court resources, 59% to judge`s workload, and 42% to the amount of the judge's remuneration.

TABLE 3.7. «IF SUCH CHANGES OCCURRED (THAT IS, IN THE PREVIOUS QUESTION YOU CHOSE "STRONGLY AGREE" OR "RATHER AGREE"), WHAT WERE THE REASONS FOR SUCH CHANGES? SELECT ALL RELEVANT ANSWER OPTIONS? (% AMONG THE JUDGES WHO AGREED THAT THE CHANGES HAVE HAPPENED, WHICH HAVE NEGATIVELY AFFECTED THE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, N=140)

	TOTAL
Court resources (court staff, financial and technical support, premises, office equipment, etc.)	82%
Judge's workload	59%
The amount of the judge's remuneration	42%
Social security	19%
Transfer to another court, structural subdivision, assignment of other official duties	2%
Other: Unfounded accusations by the media and other influential people, the formation of a negative attitude towards judges in general, undermining the authority of the judiciary	7%
Other	4%
N	140

32% of judges surveyed said that if they receive information about a possible bribe from a colleague, they will inform NABU, 28% - that they will try to convince a colleague of the falsity of this decision, and every fifth (21%) will inform the chairman of the court.

TABLE 3.8. «IF YOU PERSONALLY RECEIVE INFORMATION THAT UNEQUIVOCALLY INDICATES THAT YOUR COLLEAGUE IS TRYING TO OBTAIN AN IMPROPER BENEFIT FROM A PARTY TO THE TRIAL, WHAT ARE YOUR LIKELY ACTIONS? (% AMONG ALL JUDGES, N=559)

	TOTAL
I will inform NABU	32%
I will try to convince a colleague that this should not be done	28%
I will inform the chief judge of the court	21%
I will inform other law enforcement agencies (prosecutor's office, SBU or police)	18%
I will advise my colleague to recuse himself in this case, without disclosing that I know of an attempt to obtain an improper benefit	10%
I will inform the High Council of Justice	10%
I will inform the Council of Judges of Ukraine	4%
I will not do anything - it is not my business	3%
I will consult with colleagues	3%
Other	0%
Refusal to answer	28%
N	559

27% of judges interviewed will inform the relevant authorities in writing and not anonymously, in anonymous form - 13% (in writing and orally).

TABLE 3.9. IF YOU NEED TO INFORM ANY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ABOUT KNOWN TO YOU MANIFESTATIONS OF CORRUPTION IN YOUR AND OTHER COURTS, WHICH METHOD WILL YOU CHOOSE? (% AMONG ALL JUDGES, N=559)

	TOTAL
I will inform in writing and give my name	27%
I will inform in writing on an anonymous basis	8%
I will inform orally and give my name	7%
I will inform orally on an anonymous basis	5%
Other	1%
It is difficult to answer	31%
Refusal to answer	21%
N	559

Those judges who chose the anonymous form did so for fear of deteriorating relationships with colleagues (49%), and threats to the safety of family members and relatives (43%), or personal safety (33%).

TABLE 3.10. «HAVE YOUR CHOICE OF ACTIONS BEEN INFLUENCED BY THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES? (% AMONG JUDGES WHO CHOOSE AN ANONYMOUS FORM, N=70)

	TOTAL
Fear of deteriorating relations with colleagues	49%
Threat to the safety of family members and the near ones	43%
Threat to personal safety	33%
Fear of deteriorating relations with representatives of the judiciary	20%
Fear of persecution by other (except the judiciary) branches of government	14%
Possible barriers to career growth	11%
Fear of harassment by the judiciary leadership	11%
Other	4%
N	70

In general, 47% of the surveyed judges consider themselves aware of the norms of the international humanitarian community, and 11% are generally unaware.

TABLE 3.11. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF AWARE OF THE NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS THERETO, ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT)? (% AMONG ALL JUDGES, N=559)

	TOTAL
Well-informed	15%
Well acquainted with some provisions, but with some superficially	32%
Superficially aware of all the provisions	31%
Almost unaware	10%
Not at all aware	1%
It is difficult to answer	10%
N	559

SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS

TABLE 4.1. DISTRIBUTION BY OBLAST (% AMONG ALL JUDGES)

	TOTAL
Vinnnytsya	5%
Volyn	2%
Dnipropetrovsk	9%
Donetsk	4%
Zhytomyr	2%
Transcarpathia	3%
Zaporizhya	6%
Ivano-Frankivsk	3%
Kyiv	7%
Kyiv city	9%
Kirovograd	1%
Luhansk	1%
Lviv	8%
Mykolayiv	2%
Odesa	8%
Poltava	5%
Rivne	4%
Sumy	1%
Ternopil	2%
Kharkiv	8%
Kherson	3%
Khmelnysk	3%
Cherkasy	1%
Chernivtsi	0%
Chernihiv	3%
N	559

TABLE 4.2 DISTRIBUTION BY INSTANCE (% AMONG ALL JUDGES)

	TOTAL
Cassation	4%
Appeal	23%
First	73%
N	559

TABLE 4.3 DISTRIBUTION BY JURISDICTION (% AMONG ALL JUDGES)

	TOTAL
General	66%
Administrative	15%
Economic	14%
Supreme Court	4%
N	559

TABLE 4.2 DISTRIBUTION BY SEX (% AMONG ALL JUDGES)

	TOTAL
Male	48%
Female	52%
N	559

TABLE 4.3 DISTRIBUTION BY BIKOM (% AMONG ALL JUDGES)

	TOTAL
Up to 39 years old	20%
40-49 years old	47%
50-59 years old	22%
60 and over	5%
Refuse to answer	7%
N	559

TABLE 4.4 QUESTION: «HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN WORKING AS A JUDGE?» (% AMONG ALL JUDGES)

	TOTAL
Less than 3 years	10%
3 – 5 years	2%
6 – 10 years	21%
11 – 20 years	48%
More than 20 years	15%
Refuse to answer	5%
N	559

TABLE 4.5 WHAT WAS YOUR PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE AFTER HAVING COMPLETED A LAW DEGREE PRIOR TO APPOINTMENT AS A JUDGE (% AMONG ALL JUDGES)

	APPEAL AND CASSATION	FIRST	TOTAL
Judge's assistant	20%	46%	39%
As court staff (other than judge's assistant)	18%	23%	22%
Law enforcement agency officer (Ministry of the Interior/Police , Prosecutor Office, Security Service of Ukraine, NABU, State Investigation Bureau)	22%	18%	19%
Employee of other government agency (other than mentioned above positions)	18%	12%	14%
Defense lawyer	12%	12%	12%
In education or science area (teaching, research, etc.)	8%	3%	5%
Private or state enforcement officer	3%	3%	3%
Worker at the plant\factory	3%	1%	1%
Private or public notary	3%	0%	1%
Other	5%	3%	4%
Other: legal adviser	4%	3%	3%
Refuse to answer	10%	5%	7%
N	153	406	559